In this paper, two non-cooperatives and one cooperative game are established in order to investigate the effectiveness of cooperative advertising in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. In a closed-loop supply chain, companies tend to increase the return rate of used products. Therefore, the retailer spends for green advertising in order to encourage customers to return their used products by increasing their concerns and awareness about environmental issues. On the other hand, the manufacturer spends on national advertising to create an image of the product and enhance its sale. Since in the manufacturer's point of view, remanufacturing used products is more profitable than manufacturing new ones, he prefers to give some incentives such as participating in the retailer's green advertising expenditure and paying return costs per unit of returned products to the retailer to collect more used products. Results show that both channel members spend their highest and lowest advertising expenditures in cooperative and Nash game, respectively. Also, the higher the differences between the costs of manufacturing new and remanufacturing used products, the more willing the manufacturer is to participate in the retailer's green advertising expenditure.
Introduction
Cooperative advertising (co-op ad) is an integrated system used in the supply chain in order to coordinate the advertising activities of channel members. For marketing and building the long-term image of the product in the mind of the customers, the manufacturer introduces the product to the public through wide advertising at the national level. Moreover, the retailer introduces the product to people through marketing at the regional level for selling and attracting customers (Xie and Neyret, 2009 ). In a co-op ad system, manufacturers may take pay part in the advertising expenditures of retailers in addition to their own advertising, and increase their profits by enhancing mutual cooperation and partnerships with retailers (Berger, 1972) . In co-op ad mechanism, manufacturer allocates a significant amount to advertising programs (Yue et al., 2006) and covers all or some of the advertising costs of retailers (Bergen and John, 1997) . Most studies conducted on co-op ad have static models; a single-period model is used in these studies to analyse the relationships and interactions between the member (Chaab and Rasti-Barzoki, 2016; Karray and Surti, 2016; Seyed Esfahani et al., 2011; Xie and Wei, 2009) .
Numerous scientists have examined the key impacts of co-op ad in supply chains with one manufacturer and one retailer. The results of these studies propose that co-op ad activities are powerful motivations that increase the retailer's advertising. Thus, consumers' demands will affect order quantity (Chan et al., 2016 ) and this will expand and eventually enhance the profits of manufacturer and retailer (Ahmadi-Javid and Hoseinpour, 2012; Aust, 2015; Aust and Buscher, 2012; Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2014; Huang et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2013) . Almost all of the papers in co-op ad literature confirm the effectiveness of collaborative advertising activities in increasing the members' profits.
Due to the increased environmental concerns and stringent rules in recent decades, the devastation of large quantities of end-of-life products has attracted much attention and become an important subject (Östlin et al., 2008) . Through recycling, recovery, and reuse of old products, the amount of wastage of used products can be reduced (Jayaraman, 2006; Savaskan et al., 2004) . In addition to reducing environmental risks, remanufacturing of used products also reduces the cost of product manufacturing. Therefore, remanufacturing of used products in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is very important (Guide et al., 2003; Nobil and Taleizadeh, 2016; Östlin et al., 2008) . In a forward supply chain, there is a flow from suppliers to manufacturers, retailers, and consumer, while in the CLSC, there is a two-way flow involving a flow from the manufacturer to the consumer and a reverse flow from the consumer to the manufacturer. In the forward supply chain, the manufacture sells the product to the retailer at wholesale price and the retailer sells it to the consumers at retail price. In the reverse flow, used products are collected from the consumers and returned to the manufacturer (Souza, 2013) . CLSC can be considered as a combination of reverse and forward supply chains that involves product life cycle from the beginning to the end (Fallah et al., 2015) .
In recent years, many companies including Ford, Caterpillar, IBM, and Xerox have achieved high profits by integrating their forward and backward activities and designing a CLSC network, and thus saving costs from the remanufacturing of reusable products (Atasu et al., 2010; Chen and Chang, 2012; Choi et al., 2013; Qiang et al., 2013; Wei et al., 2015) .
In a CLSC, companies tend to increase the return rate of used products because of the residual value that end-of-use products have, which translates into higher operational efficiency (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009 ). For example, Kodak encourages consumers and retailers to return their used cameras to the company with incentive payment, because parts of the camera can be used to generate new cameras (Savaskan et al., 2004) .
In this paper, the effectiveness of co-op ad is investigated in a CLSC with one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer can spend for green advertising in order to encourage customers to return their used products by increasing their concerns and awareness about environmental issues (De Giovanni, 2014) . In addition, the retailer pays return price to the customers per returned product (Shi et al., 2011) . On the other hand, the manufacturer spends on national advertising to create an image about the product and enhance its sale. Since remanufacturing cost is significantly lower than manufacturing cost in the manufacturer's point of view, he prefers to give incentives such as participating in the retailer's green advertising expenditure and paying return cost per unit of returned product to the retailer to collect more used products. Two non-cooperatives (Nash and Stackelberg) and one cooperative game theoretical model are established to analyse the proposed problem. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature in many ways. First, we assess the efficiency of green advertising for encouraging customers to return their used products. Second, the efficiency of the co-op ad for coordinating CLSC is assessed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, the main assumptions, notations, and formulation of the problem are presented. Nash, Stackelberg and cooperative game-theoretic results for the problem are presented in Section 3. Discussion and sensitivity analysis on the results obtained in three games are presented in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion and some future research directions are provided in Section 5. Also, proofs of the propositions appear in the Appendix.
Modelling and assumptions
In this section, key assumptions of the problem and its mathematical formulation are presented.
Key assumptions
Assumption 1 The manufacturer spends on national advertising expenditure in order to increase demand. On the other hand, the retailer invests on marketing efforts to encourage customers to return their used products. Part of the retailer's marketing efforts is paid by the manufacturer.
Assumption 2 The structure of the considered CLSC is demonstrated in Figure 1 . The manufacture sells the product to the retailer at wholesale price w, and the retailer sells it at retail price p. For the returned product, the retailer pays retailer price e to the customer, and the manufacturer pays returning cost b to the retailer. Assumption 3 The cost of manufacturing a new product using used parts is less than that of manufacturing a product using new parts. Moreover, remanufacturing cost is the same for all the returned products. This assumption expresses the fact that the costs of collecting used products with remanufacturing process costs such as quality inspection of the returned product to determine its usability and costs of separation and recovery of used parts and assembling these parts with new parts are less than the costs of manufacturing products using new parts and raw materials.
Assumption 4 The return rate of used products (α) is a fraction of demand. As mentioned in Assumption 1, a fraction of returned products is influenced by the retailer's marketing efforts.
Assumption 5 The fixed cost paid by the retailer to the customer (e) for returning used products is less than the fixed cost paid by the manufacturer to retailer for collecting used products (b).
Assumption 6 The manufacturer has an unlimited capacity for collecting returned products. Therefore, all the products returned by the customer will be accepted. In addition, the quality of new products and remanufacturing products is the same. In this paper, for simplicity, it is assumed that the quality and price of the products are the same (Debo et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2011) .
Assumption 7 The demand function used in this paper is continuous and definitive, and is expressed as a square root. This form of demand function is used widely in co-op ad literature (Aust and Buscher, 2012; Seyed Esfahani et al., 2011; Xie and Wei, 2009 ). The demand function is influenced by the manufacturer's national advertising.
The notations used in this paper are as follows: 
Return rate of used product θ Effect of retailer's marketing effort on a fraction of returned products
Model description
The retailer purchases products at the wholesale price (w) from the manufacturer and sells them at the retail price (p). The demand for the product (D) is influenced by the manufacturer's national advertising expenditure. The retailer invests on marketing effort (α) in order to encourage customers to return their used products. Thus, a fraction of the demand ( ) θ = α α is returned by consumers. The retailer pays e to customers to collects their used products and transfers them to the manufacturer by receiving b from him. Based on the considered assumptions, the retailer's profit equation is as follows:
The manufacturer produced new and remanufactured products with costs c 1 and c 2 , respectively. The manufacturer's profit function is as follows: 
Since returned products must be less than the total demand, the following constraint must be considered in the model.
Game models
In this section, two non-cooperative games including Nash and Stackelberg (manufacturer as leader) and one cooperative game are established to analyse the problem.
Nash game
In Nash game, the decision powers of the retailer and the manufacturer are equivalent. Consequently, channel members independently and simultaneously choose their strategies. The purpose of this section is to obtain the Nash equilibrium point * * * ( , , ) N N N A t α for the proposed model.
( )
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibrium for the game is as follows: 
Since the coefficient of participation rate (t) in the manufacturer's objective function equation (2) is negative, the optimal value of * N t would be zero. The optimal value of advertising expenditures * *
( , )
N N A α
shows that as the wholesale price increases, both channel members become willing to spend more on advertising.
Stackelberg (manufacturer as leader)
The purpose of this section is to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium point 
Proposition 2: The Stackelberg manufacturer equilibrium is as follows: 
Results indicate that in this game, in contrary to the Nash game, the manufacturer is willing to participate in advertising expenditure. Nevertheless, the rate of participation * S t is the increasing function of the difference between manufacturing and remanufacturing costs (c 1 -c 2 ) and the decreasing function of return cost paid by the manufacturer to the retailer per returned product (b).
Cooperative game
Two non-cooperative games including Nash and Stackelberg (manufacturer as leader) were discussed in the previous section. In this section, a cooperative game is established to model the problem in which the retailer and the manufacturer wish to maximise total profit. The optimal solution of this game 
Proposition 3: The optimal solution for the cooperative game is as follows: 
The obtained solution
gives maximum profits for the whole system. Since there are no non-zero coefficients for the participation rate t in equation (9), it is open to take any value between zero and one.
Discussion and sensitivity analysis
In this section, optimal solutions obtained in Nash, Stackelberg (manufacturer as leader), and cooperative games are discussed and compared regarding the different values of parameters. For sensitivity analysis, parameters are set as follows: c 1 = 100, c 2 = 50, b = 40, e = 30, w = 140 and p = 200.
Comparisons of advertising expenditures
Taking the calculated solutions into account, regardless of values of parameters, the following inequalities about the retailer and manufacturer's advertising expenditure in the established games can be obtained:
It can be inferred that the highest and lowest advertising expenditures for both retailer and manufacturer occur in cooperative and Nash games, respectively. Since the participation rate is positive in the Stackelberg manufacturer game, the retailer is willing to spend more on her advertising than in Nash game in which t equals zero. The literature of co-op ad in the forward supply chain suggests the same results about national and local advertising in a cooperative game: the highest advertising expenditures occur in a cooperative environment (Seyed Esfahani et al., 2011; Chaab and Rasti-Barzoki, 2016; Xie and Neyret, 2009 
Comparison of profits
In this section, the joint and individual profits of channel members are compared.
Parameters β and θ show the effectiveness of manufacturer and retailer's advertising expenditure on increasing the demand and fraction of returned used products, respectively. Therefore, it is noteworthy to analyse the profits of channel members in the three games regarding these parameters. The optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are illustrated in Figures 4-5. As discussed in Proposition 3, participation rate is open to take any value between zero and one. Therefore, the profits of the retailer and manufacturer cannot be separately calculated for cooperative game. Since maximum profits of channel members in Nash and Stackelberg games depend on the relationship between parameters which are related to cost and price (c 1 , c 2 , b, e, w, p) , it is not possible to express any general result about the comparison of profits in these games. However, for parameter values which are considered in this section, as can be seen in Figures 4-5 , the profits of both channel members are higher in Stackelberg game than Nash game.
Because the manufacturer participates in the retailer's advertising expenditure only in Stackelberg game, the comparison between the profits of channel members in Nash and Stackelberg games provides a clear picture of the effectiveness of co-op ad. Therefore, it could be inferred from the results that co-op ad is a beneficial coordination mechanism (at least in some cases) in the CLSC in order to encourage more customers to return their used products. In other words, channel members prefer to play the Stackelberg game with each other rather than to be in a conflict situation and maximise their profits individually in the Nash game. Figure 6 represents the total profit of channel members in the three established games. Because channel members decide to maximise the whole system's profits cooperatively in the cooperative game, the highest profit will be achieved in this game. 
Comparison of participation rates
As discussed in Section 3, the manufacturer is not willing to participate in the retailer's advertising expenditure in Nash game. In the Stackelberg game (manufacturer as leader), the participation rate of the manufacturer only depends on c 1 , c 2 , b and e. Figures 7 and 8 show that by increasing the differences between manufacturing and remanufacturing costs, the manufacturer prefers to participate more in the retailer's advertising expenditure in order to encourage more customers to return their used products.
Figure 9
Sensitivity analysis of participation rate to return price and cost (see online version for colours) Figure 9 show that participation rate is increasing to e and decreasing to b. It means that the manufacturer decreases his participation rate as return cost b is increased. These results can also be inferred from Stackelberg equilibrium obtained in Section 3.1. In summary, the manufacturer is willing to participate in the retailer's advertising expenditure when there are considerable differences between manufacturing and remanufacturing costs, and also the return cost which he pays to the retailer is not too high. On the other hand, by increasing the return cost paid by the retailer to the customer (e), the manufacturer increases participation rate in order to compensate for a part of retailer's expenditure.
Conclusions
In this paper, three game-theoretic models are established to investigate the effectiveness of co-op ad strategies in a CLSC. Demand is influenced by the manufacturer's national advertising expenditure. A fraction of consumers would return their used products to the retailer by receiving a returning price. Since remanufacturing of used products has a lower cost for the manufacture in comparison to manufacturing new products, he/she prefers to give some incentives to the retailer to collect as much used products as possible from the consumers. As a result, the manufacturer would participate in the retailer's green advertising expenditure which is spent in order to encourage customers to return their used products. On the other hand, the manufacturer must pay a cost for each returned unit of the product in order to compensate for the return price which is paid by the retailer to the customers.
The manufacturer is not willing to participate in the retailer's green advertising expenditure in Nash game. In Stackelberg game, participation rate depends on differences between remanufacturing and manufacturing costs, return price (paid by the retailer to the customer), and return cost (paid by the manufacturer to the retailer). Results demonstrate that the higher the differences between the costs of manufacturing new products and remanufacturing used products, the more willing the manufacturer is to participate in the retailer's green advertising expenditure. However, increases in return cost leads to a lower participation rate from the manufacturer. Both channel members spend their highest and lowest advertising expenditures in cooperative and Nash games, respectively. Comparing the profits of channel members in Nash and Stackelberg games for the considered numerical example as well as the sensitivity analysis indicate that co-op ad is a profitable channel coordination mechanism.
As a future research direction, researchers are recommended to consider leftovers as well as used product returns in their studies. Leftovers include products that were unsold as well as those which were sold but returned because the customer was dissatisfied with the quality. The researchers can also focus on the simultaneous analysis of pricing and advertising decisions of channel members in a CLSC. Moreover, more retailers can be involved in the channel and their competition can be considered in the model. Since inventory system policies of the retailer affects customers' purchasing behaviour, pricing strategies and sales of the channel members (Gerchak, 2016; Al-Rifai et al., 2016, Kim and Kim, 2016; Radhamani et al., 2016) , considering it as well as marketing strategies can be an interesting research direction.
Appendix 2

Proof of Proposition 1
It is obvious that optimal participation rate for Nash game is zero. By taking t = 0 in manufacturer's profit function, profit functions of both manufacturer and retailer are concave w.r.t A and α, respectively. Therefore, Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving the first order condition: 
